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MEMORIES OF THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

YB WEB DESK. Dated: 4/22/2021 12:00:07 PM

This description also points to the commonality in the history of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in a wider background of time and space, that also deserves present recollection Last month’s celebration of the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh’s independence, brought back some memories of those times. Here they are, for those whose interest may have been aroused by Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to our neighbouring country on that occasion. Fifty years ago, in 1971, I was in the Indian Foreign Service and assigned as Political Counselor in India’s permanent mission to the UN, at New York. My work involved following current events and the role of the UN. The ongoing tension and conflict in then East Pakistan was a part of that job. This became especially so in the heated environment of late 1971 for the subcontinent. The Cold War was at full blast, the US was seeking a historic opening with China, and India was steadfastly maintaining its policy of non-alignment, while grappling with massive refugee inflows fleeing the genocide inflicted by the Pakistani army on its own population in the East. Much has been written about this conflict. Here are some key vignettes from the sidelines of action at the UN. As the situation escalated, with rising pressure at the UN from the US on behalf of their Pakistani proxies, in August 1971 there was a news flash that India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had just signed a bilateral treaty. There was then an immediate media request for an interview on this treaty with the Indian Mission in New York. We could not delay a response and I was asked to go for this interview, though we had not till then received the treaty’s text. I prepared carefully, as best as I could, based on what we knew within the Mission on India’s overall policy posture. A main question asked by the media was if this treaty with the USSR affected India’s policy of non-alignment. I denied this firmly, non-alignment being a cornerstone of our foreign policy, and on return to office, was glad to find that my position had been in line with the treaty text that had meanwhile arrived. As the conflict continued, some Bangladesh representatives also came to New York to further their cause in late 1971. I was asked to help them. Some of these visitors later became important figures in independent Bangladesh. One of them was Rehman Sobhan, a friend from our student days, who also wrote about our discussions in his memoirs, published just five years ago. Referring in them to me, he wrote that I “assured him that no action by the UN would frustrate the march of the Indian Army to Dhaka as the Soviet Union had told them of a veto,” in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The situation continued to escalate through the fall, an important and busy time at the UN as this conflict continued. Growing pressure on the Pakistani military from the Mukti Bahini freedom fighter forces in Bangladesh led to a rapidly unfolding endgame in December 1971. On December 3, the Pakistan air force launched sneak attacks aimed at disabling runways on 12 forward western Indian airbases. The Indian Air Force shrugged this off and established air superiority over East Pakistan. This was a new dimension of a direct military conflict between India and Pakistan, and the matter was further taken up in the UNSC on December 4. There the US delegation, led by George Bush Sr twice proposed ceasefire resolutions, supported by a majority of members, including the People’s Republic of China that had just been seated in the UNSC, replacing Taiwan in October (with India’s support ironically). A ceasefire would have been severely prejudicial to Bangladesh and India, given the ongoing ground operations of the Indian Army in support of Bangladeshi liberation. We were not members of the UNSC at the time, but our Ambassador was invited to the session, where I went with him and we lobbied heavily behind the scenes. With Indian support, the USSR insisted that members of the Bangladeshi liberation movement also be invited to the UNSC to present their case and evidence of heinous crimes by the Pakistani army. The ceasefire resolutions were ultimately vetoed by the USSR. The Soviet veto gave a brief window to the Bangladeshi freedom forces, supported by the Indian Army, to persevere with their goal of liberating their country.